f61ec6b39135a153fba76e3b89d226f1bea8fedd
5 Commits
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f61ec6b391 |
Read integrity, as-of context, and the shadow matchup resolve (A1-A7)
Seven orders of measurement-first repair. The served grade does not move. A0/A1 — the unordered page walk returned the right COUNT and the wrong ROWS: 410-617 of 2,490 duplicated with an equal number never returned, while rows.length matched the server exactly. safePaginate orders on a real unique key, verifies the tuple at runtime, and THROWS on a query error instead of treating it as end-of-data. Both hits PROVES are withdrawn: they were drawn through that reader, and defense_by_direction's distinct-n was likely below the gate floor all along. A2/A2b — rolled across every reader: 11 FAIL -> 0. Composite keys pulled from pg_index (the context tables are dated-composite and had no single unique column). The unordered helper is deleted, not parked. A3 — ledgerService and retentionService defaulted the SAME env var to DIFFERENT versions, so no ledger row ever carried the marker eligibility requires. One source now. model_snapshots settlement moved onto the cron: 15,484 -> 28,894 settled, repaired-champion 0 -> 7,556. A4 — hitsFactorContext takes an as-of cutoff. Refusal over reconstruction: no row at-or-before the date means the factor does not apply, never the nearest row. Live path unchanged, proven 400/400 on real rows. A5 — factor_inputs freezes what the factor READ, never the multiplier, so an audit can recompute and check. It also recorded the finding: the three hits factors have NEVER fired. prop.opponent and prop.opposing_pitcher are read by the resolver and written by nothing. A6/A7 — matchupKeys resolves those keys from the posted lineup plus the schedule's probable pitchers, and fires the factors into a SHADOW freeze: 248 fires on 308 props, 245 of which would move the grade. The served forecast is untouched. specs/a8-shadow-factor-gate.md pre-registers the test that decides whether they ever go live. Nothing is turned on. CALIBRATION_DEPLOYED stays []. Both verdicts stay withdrawn. 4,772 tests / 371 suites green, web build exit 0, read-integrity harness 34/34. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> |
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494c83cf76 |
Hunt the window-bug class: three more paths, and the forward re-audit rule
in code PHASE 0 — getStatRows is the single base-rate path, so every branch is audited, plus the feature builders since l20_avg is the season reference projectionFor reads: getStatRows MLB -> estimator base fullLog CORRECT ( |
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1bcdd8b305 |
Fix the ROOT: bind props to their real game, never date by the grade clock
Order 1.5 Phase 1. PropLine emits NO commence_time (grep-verified: zero hits in proplineAdapter), so ledgerService's `dateET(prop.game_time) || dateET(gradedTs)` always fell through to the GRADE timestamp — and a 01:00/03:00 UTC snapshot is 21:00/23:00 ET the PREVIOUS day. Tonight's props were filed under yesterday, settlement correctly found no game there, and Order 1's void logic turned that into 64 destroyed results. gameBinder.attachGameTimes() now matches every prop to a scheduled game by TEAMS across the plausible ET window (grade date, +1, -1) and attaches the GAME'S OWN time/date/id. It runs in snapshotService before grading and before the ledger write, so ledger, retention and settlement all inherit the correct date from one place. HARD CONTRACT: an unbindable prop returns NOTHING. ledgerService no longer has a grade-clock fallback — a row with no real game time is SKIPPED and counted, because a mis-dated row is fabricated data and the ledger holds real values or nothing. A slate that binds nothing pages. DOUBLEHEADERS are reported, never guessed: two games with the same teams on one date mark the binding `ambiguous` so settlement can decline rather than attribute a prop to the wrong game. (Real example already in the data: mlb:2026-07-11:MilwaukeeBrewers@PittsburghPirates(Game1).) Also fixes retention, which had the SAME bug from last night — I had dated model_snapshots rows with the snapshot clock. Rows now take the ET date of the bound game_time. Suite 282/3381 green, build exit 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SmNjJAwEnqHPtXbvSZR8kA |
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5a5e37e32e |
Retention: fill enrichment fields + page on a zero-write slot
PHASE 1 — cron capture needed NO wiring. Verified in code: the scheduler tick calls runAll = snapshotService.runAllSnapshots, which loops runSnapshot per sport, which already carries the onGraded -> retention hook. The scheduled path and the manual path are the SAME function. The reason no cron cycle had been captured is simply that no slot has fired since retention deployed (slots are 14/19/22/1/3 UTC; retention landed ~02:55). Induced proof follows the deploy. PHASE 2 — archetype/team/opponent were permanently null because retention persisted at GRADE time, before enrichment attaches them. Retention still COLLECTS at grade time (the only moment the feature vector exists) but now PERSISTS after enrichment, merging those three fields via retentionService.mergeEnrichment. The merge is pure and fills ONLY those three fields — features and every model output are grade-time values and must never be rewritten by enrichment; a test asserts that. Unmatched rows (refusals not in the enriched slate) keep nulls rather than guesses. The empty-slate early return now persists too: a refusal-only slate is still history worth keeping. PHASE 3 — ZERO-WRITE ALARM. opsWatch.retentionZeroWriteAlarm pages at missed-snapshot severity when a slot GRADED props but retention wrote fewer rows than the slate (or nothing). runSnapshot now returns retentionRows so the scheduler can evaluate it. Retention is best-effort by design so it can never break a snapshot — which means a broken write is silent by construction. This is the counterweight. A slot that graded nothing never false-pages; an absent count reads as NOTHING and still pages, distinct from a reported 0. Suite 280/3349 green, build exit 0. Outcome stamping deliberately NOT implemented (depends on the settlement fix). Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SmNjJAwEnqHPtXbvSZR8kA |
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d3ffa1b8c2 |
Retention: model_snapshots live + base64 SSH key support
RETENTION (Phase 2, priority zero). History starts compounding tonight. migration 025 model_snapshots — APPLIED to prod. Append-only, one row per graded prop PER SIDE PER CYCLE, with a unique index on (snapshot_id, player_key, stat, line, side) so a retried cycle cannot duplicate. RLS on, service-role writes only. What it captures that the ledger never did: - features jsonb — the model's INPUTS. Without these a backtest can only grade our own homework; with them any future model can be replayed against the exact conditions this one faced. - REFUSALS (refused + refusal_reason). The ledger drops them, so a gate refusing props that would have WON is invisible — unmeasurable lost edge. Captured via a new onGraded hook in gradeSlateService that fires with BOTH sides before any filtering. - grade_11, the pre-collapse grade. The 4-letter map throws away the entire live C-/C/C+/B- range. - model_version + code_sha on every row. ledger_entries mixes pre/post-fix grades with no marker and cannot be separated retroactively. - p_win / ev_pct / fair_odds / takeable / value — none of which any permanent store held. Wiring: analyzeViaEngine1 attaches _features/_grade_11 (underscore = internal); gradeSlateService fires onGraded then STRIPS them so they never reach a cache or API payload; snapshotService builds rows and persists best-effort. Retention reuses the LEDGER's dateET/gameIdFor helpers so rows share the ledger's natural key exactly — otherwise the settle pass could never join outcomes onto them. Rows are written BEFORE the empty- slate early return: a slate that refused everything is exactly the case worth recording. CONTRACT HELD: retention is injectable and every path is caught. persist() returns errors, never throws; a missing Supabase client is SKIPPED, not an error. A retention failure can never break a snapshot. BACKUP: backup-db.sh now accepts BACKUP_SSH_KEY as base64 (recommended — survives env-var newline mangling, which is how injected SSH keys usually break silently) OR raw PEM, detected by decoding and looking for the PEM header. Verified both forms detect correctly against a real generated key. Suite 279/3325 green, build exit 0. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com> Claude-Session: https://claude.ai/code/session_01SmNjJAwEnqHPtXbvSZR8kA |